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In the 11 Pacificus-Helvidius 11 debate of 1793, Alexander Hamilton 
locked horns with James Madison in a classic excha.nge of broadsides on 
the.tssue of.express versus inherent executive powers. In his inter-
pretation of presidential powers, Hamilton sows the seeds for an argu-
ment which justifies the exercise of executive powers in combating 
situations of .domestic emergency and in matters concerning the general 
welfare or public interest. The seeds of this theory took firm root 
more than sixty years later in the administration of Abraham Lincoln. 
Subsequently, the growth of these roots was stimulated by the Supreme 
Court's decisions in the famous cases of rn·re Neagle (1890)~ In re 
Debs (1895), and United States v. Midwest Oil Co. (1915) and has 
b1ossomed into a fullblown, if not overblown, succession of 11 strong 11 
Presidents during the last seventy years. Along with the spiraling 
I. development of executive power, volumes of critical material gushed 
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budding "textbook Presidency" rationa1e; 1 however, the impact of this 
response has been slight, and as one author of the late 1950's put it, 
"the President of today is a creature of custom. 11 2 
Given the above introduction, the purpose of this paper is to 
discuss the role of the Supreme Court in an expanding Presidency by 
focusing on its decisions in Youngstown Sheet·and:Tube·Co~ v. Saw.Yer 
(1952), New York Times Co. v. United States (197l), and.United States 
v. Nixon {1974). It is believed that the various opinions found in the 
three cases mirror the ever-increasing debate which surrounds the. growth 
of executive powers. As rulings, the decisions not only provide the 
Supreme Court's views on the scope of inherent executive powers, but also 
provide a means with,'which to analyze the role of the Court in the ex-
panding Presidency. Since each of the decisions turned on the special 
circumstances of the particular case, it is s.uggested that none of the 
rulings can be read as imposing any serious limitations on inherent 
executive powers. On the contrary, the burden and thesis of this paper 
is that the Court, in each of the three cases, paved the way for future 
presidential claims of implied powers. 
lThe term is borrowed from Thomas E. Cronin, "The Textbook Presi.;. 
dency and Political Science," a paper presented at the 66th Annual Meet-
ing of the American Political Science Association in 1970. As Cronin 
sees it, the "textbook Presidency" rationale is the notion that the 
President is the chief architect of public policy and that only he, by 
interpreting his powers expansively, can engineer progressive cha.nge. 
Two classic texts which follow this framework are Richard Neustadt's 
Presidential Power {New York: New American Library, 1960); and Clinton 
Rossiter's The American Presidenc¥ (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1956). 
For the recent responses challenging this rationale, see Theodore Lowi, 
The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969); Daniel P. Moynihan, 
Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding· (New York: Macmillan, 1969); and Peter 
Drucker, The Age of Discontinuity (New York: Harper and Row, 1969). 
2Robert G. McC....:roskey (ed.), "The Powers of th President," in ESsays 
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An analysis of the three cases necessarily entails an examination 
of the events and writings that give the concept of inherent executive 
powers its initial focus. 3 In the 11 Pacificus-Helvidius 11 exchange, the 
argument invoked by Hamilton was .a defense of President Washington's 
action in issuing a proclamation of neutrality upon the outbreak of war 
between England and France. Washington's action triggered charges by 
his political opponents, the Republicans, that the proclamation was 
without constitutional~.or statutory authority. Hamilton, writing under 
the pseudonym 11 Pacificus, 11 responded to these charges by making a dis-
tinction between the legislative and executive grants of power found in 
the Constitution. The opening clause of Article I begins on one hand 
with the words "all legislative powers herein granted" and proceeds with 
an enumeration of these powers. On the other hand, the initial sentence 
of Article II states that 11 the executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America." After enumerating the speci-
fied constitutional powers of the President--such as the power to grant 
pardons, to receive ambassadors and to make appointments, Hamilton con-
tends that it would be unreasonable to assume that the executive powers 
were confined to these authorizations alone and concludes his argument 
by saying: 
The enumeration ought therefore to be considered as intended to 
specify merely the principle articles implied in the definition 
of executive power, interpreted in conformity with the other parts 
of the Constitution and with the principles of free government. 
The general doctrine of our constitution then is that the executive 
power of the nation is vested in the President, subject only to 
3Arbitrarily, I begin the development of "executive powers" with 
the argument invoked by Hamilton in the 11 Pacificus-Helvidius 11 exchange. 
The concept of executive powers, however, ean easily be traced to 1690, 
when Locke posited that "the law-making power is not always in being 
and usually too numerous, and so too slow for the dispatch requisite to 
-4-
the exceptions and qualifications which are expressed in the 
instrument.4 
It was Hamilton's view, then, that the President possesses both 
inherent and express powers which are subject only to those qualifi-
cations found in the Constitution. Differentiating between these two 
types of power, he cites the removal power5 and the power to recognize 
new governments as examples of inherent executive powers. According 
to Hamilton, the President's inherent power to judge the obligations 
of our treaties with foreign nations justified Washington's proclamation 
of neutrality. 
Writing as 11 Helvidius, 11 Madison rejected Hamilton's theory on the 
grounds that the notion of inherent powers was not based on American 
practices but borrowed from the royal prerogatives of British govern-
ment.6 The underpinnings of Madison's challenge were soon swept aside 
in both theory and practice. By 1840 Abel Upshur could observe that 
execution. therefore there is a latitude left to the executive 
power to do many things of choice which the laws do not prescribe;" Of 
Civil Government (Book II, chap. xiv). ~ 
4Alexander Hamilton, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Henry Cabot 
Lodge (ed.), Vol. IV (New York: Putnam, 1904), p. 144. 
5Hamilton's citation of the removal power is probably derived from 
what has come to be known as the "decision of 1789. 11 In the very first 
Congress to assemble under the Constitution, the initial senten~e· of 
Article II was invoked interestingly enough by Madison and other congress-
men: to support the contention that the President had the power to remove 
officers whose appointments were made with the advice and consent of the 
Senate. C. Herman Pritchett suggests that a majority in Congress felt the 
same way: 11The language actually put into the statute ••• reflected the 
majority conclusion that the President already had the right of removal 
on the basis of his 'executive power' under the Constitution;" The Ameri-
can Constitution (2nd ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 334. 
6Louis Fisher, President and ConTress: Power and Policy (New York: 
Free Press, 1972), p. 33. For the fu 1 text of Madison's argument, see 
The Writings of James MadiSon, Gaillard Hunt (ed.) VI (New York: Putnam, 





it had been "gravely asserted in Congress that whatever power is niether 
legislative nor judiciary, is of course, executive, and, as such, belongs 
to the President under the Constitution. 117 
The high-water mark, if not the widest interpretation of executive 
powers, is found in the practices and policies of Presiqent Lincoln. As 
John P. Roche points out, 11 the administration of Abraham Lincoln provides 
••• the first full display of non-constitutional, non-statutory author-
1tY. applied to a domestic emergency. 118 .consequently, Lincoln's exercise 
of executive prerogative in situations of 11 domestic em~rgency 11 expanded 
the interpretation of "executive powers" by providing the concept with 
a new focus in rationale. 
It was Lincoln's belief, that as the protector and defender of the 
Constitution, he had the responsibility to use any and all means to pre-
serve the Union. When Confederate sympathizers interrupted rail and 
telegraph communications between Washington, D. C. :~nd Annapoli$, Mary-
land, Lincoln on April 27, 1861, seized the rail and telegraph installa-
tions. A week later, he ordered the regular army increased by 27,414 
officers and men and the navy by 18,000. Such an obvious disregard of 
the expressed constitutional delegation of pow.er to C!>ngress 11 to raise 
and support armies, 11 evoked one loyal Republican senator to comment,i:'~J· 
have never met anyone who claimed that the·President could, PY proclama-
tion, increase the army or navy. 119 
7cited by John P. Roche, 11 Executiye Power and Domestic Emergency: 
1he Quest for Prerogative, 11 ·western Political Quarterly,·V (December, 
1952)' p. 598. 
8rnid., p. 598. 
9 W. E. Binkley, The Powers of the President· (Garden City, New York: 







Although Lincoln did request a grant of retroactive authority 
from Congress for his actions, his request for authority was not made 
until he called Congress into speci~l session on JJly 4th--more than 
two months after seizing the rail and telegraph installations. In his 
message to Congress, Lincoln justified his actions by saying, "These 
measures, whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon what ap-
peared to be a popular demand and a public necessity ••• nothing has 
been done beyond the constitutional competence of Congress. 1110 On 
August 6, Congress accepted the request for retroactive authority by 
providing in statute that 11all the acts, proclamations, and orders of 
the President respecting the army and navy of the United States ••• 
are hereby approved and in all respects made.valid, 11 but there was also 
the qualifier, "as if they had been issued and done under the previous 
express authority and direction of Congress. 1111 Although the catch 
here suggests that the President had, in effect, been working for Congress 
all along, Lincoln's frequent exercise of executive powers throughout the 
Civil War simply undermined the assertion that there was a "previous 
express authority." ·Invoking his executive powers without the advice 
or approval of Congress, Lincoln turned government money over to 
private individuals, suspended the writ of habeas corpus, and authorized 
the military trial of civilians. The President's order to establish 
military commissions for the trial of civilians drew bitter criticism 
from various quarters and the question of its legality reached the 
Supreme Court in 1864 and again in 1866. 
In a proclamation of September 24, 1862, Lincoln coupled the sus-







pension of habeas corpus with an order that authorized military com-
manders to seize and try by military commissions civilians who engaged 
in 11disloyal practices, 11 even in areas outside the actual fields of 
military operation. Although Congress ratified the habeas corpus sus-
pension in a subsequent act (1863), it never provided statutory authori-
ty for the trial of civilians by military tribunals. While the war was 
still in progress, an attempt was made by Clement Vallandigham, a notor-
ious agitator, to bring the validity of his arrest, trial and conviction 
by military authorities before the Supreme Court. The Court in Ex parte 
Vallandigham (1864) held that it was without jurisdiction and dismissed 
the case. 
With the war over and Lincoln dead, the Court challenged the Presi-
dent1s executive powers by entertaining a similar problem in Ex parte 
Milligan, (1866). Lambdin Milligan, a citizen of Indiana, was arrested 
at his home in 1864, was. found guilty of disloyal activities by a mili-
tary corrunission in October of the same year, and was sentenced to be 
hanged on May 19, 1865. Nine days befo~e the~hanging, Milligan sued 
out a writ of habeas corpus to a federal circuit court in Indianapolis, 
claiming that his constitutional rights had been violated. 
The Supreme Court unanimously ruled that the President had exceeded 
his constitutional and statutory authority by creating military commis-
sions for the trial of civilians in areas where the civil courts were 
open and operating. The Court's ruling was weakened by the fact that 
a majority of five went further and held that Congress didn't have the 
authority to limit the constitutional rights of individuals either. 
Since Congress had not authorized the trial of civilians by military 
commissions, the issue was not properly before the Court. The majority 
opinion, delivered by Justice Davis, is more remarkable because it as-
-8-
serts in effect that the Supreme Court is the final ju.dge of what con-
stitutes a military "necessity." 
Given the fact that the war was over, the Court's post mortem 
challenge to the President's executive powers can be viewed as an 
expected reaction. No President had ever invaded cons ti tutiona 1 r.i ghts 
more flagrantly than Lincoln, but were not his motives most worthy? 
"Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? 11 12 
It becomes increasingly clear that what is perceived to be the limits of 
executive po~ers is largely determined by the situation at hand. More-
over, that rationale which dictates executive "prerogative" in cases of 
military necessity also serves as a springboard for the exercise of 
executive powers in "pressing" matters concerning the general welfare 
or public interest. 
In the case of·In·re·NeaQle (1890), the Suprem~~-Court strengthened 
the notion of presidential prerogative by applying a broad and authori-
tative interpretation to the executive power provision found in Article 
II, Section 3: the President "shall take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed. 11 The Neagle case, to say the least, arose out of a very 
·strange set of circumstances. Supreme Court Justice Field, whose 
judicial d~ties entailed the circuit court in California, had had his 
life threatened by a disappointed litigant, David S. Terry. The United 
States Attorney General assigned Deputy Marshal Neagle as a bodyguard 
when Field's circuit duties again carried him to California. Terry, 
following up on his threat, approached Field in a railroad restaurant 
and was about to draw a knife when Marshal Neagle shot and killed him. 
1 2Lincoln~ "Letter to .A. G. Hodges" (April 4, 1864), cited in 
Binkley, p. 134·. 
' ' . 
:. 
I I , 
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Neagle was released upon a writ of habeas corpus that was issued from a 
federal circuit court under a provision of the federal statutes which 
made the writ available to one "in custody for an act done or omitted in 
pursuance of a law of the United States. 11 
The "law of the United States" upon which Neagle acted was not an 
act of Congress, but an order issued by the Attorney General under the 
authority of the President. Speaking for the Court, Justice Miller be-
gan his opinion by asking the question of whether the "duty" of the 
President was "limited to the enforcement of Acts of Congress or of 
treaties of the United States according to their express terms, 11 or 
whether it 11 include(s) the rights, duties, and obligations growing out 
of the Constitution itself, o~r international relations, and all the 
protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitu-
tion." In sustaining Neagle's release, the Court held that the 11 laws 11 
found in the "faithful execution of the laws" clause were not confined 
by the acts of Congress, but included "any obligation fairly and properly 
inferable" from the Constitution or "any duty" which can "be derived 
from the general scope of ••• duties under the laws of the United 
States. 11 For Miller and the Court, there was "a peace of the United 
States" and the President was the keeper of that peace. 
Five years later, the Court took the same position in the case of 
In re Debs. When violence broke out during the American Railway Union's 
strike against railroads using Pullman cars, President Cleveland sent 
federal troops to quell the disturbance, which had obstructed interstate 
commerce and the mails, and ordered the Attorney General to obtain an 
injunction against the strikers. The validity of the injunction was 
appealed to the Supreme Court, since there was no specific statutory 
-10-
basis for the injunction. The Court sustained the injunction on the 
grounds that it was sought by the President to protect matters which 
were •tentrusted by the Constitution11 to the care of the nation. The 
Court went on to hold that it is the obligation of the Executive 11 to 
promote the interest of all, and to prevent .•• wrongdoing ••• 
resulting in injury tg the general welfare. 11 
In his Autobiography (1913), Theodore Roosevelt expands on the 
theme of the Neagle and Debs cases by positing that the President was 
the 11 steward11 of the people. His conception of the Presidency was that 
.•• every executive officer, and above all every executive 
officer in high position, was a steward of the p~ople bound 
actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the people 
••• I declined to adopt the view that what was imperatively 
necessary for the Nation could not be done by the President 
unless he could find some specific authorization to do it. My 
belief was that it was not only his right but his duty to do 
anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless such ac-
tion was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws. Under 
this interpretation of executive power I did and caused to be 
done many things not previously done by the President and 
heads of the departments. I did not usurp power, but i did 
greatly broaden the use of executive power. In other words, I 
acted for the public welfare. I acted for the common well-peing 
of all ear people, whenever and in whatever manner was necessary, 
unless prevented by direct constitutional or legislative prohi-
bition.13 
Reacting to this rather intrepid interpretation of executive powers, 
William Howard Taft denounced the idea that the President was to play 
the role of a 11 Universal Providence. 11 In a series of lectures given at 
the University of Virginia after his Presidential term in 1915, Taft 
stated: 
The true view of the executive function, as I conceive it, is that 
the President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and 
reasonably traced to some specific grant of:'. power or justly implied 
and included with such express grant as proper and necessary to its 
13rneodore Roosevelt~ Autobfography (New York: Macmillan, 1913)', 
pp. 388-89. 
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exercise. • • . There is no undefined residuum which he 
can exercise because it seems to him to .be. i.n the public 
interest, and there is nothing in the.Neagle case and its 
definition of a law in the United Statl~ or in other pre-
cedents, warranting such an inference. 
Later, in another section of the lecture, Taft returned to this theme 
saying that 
••• the view of ••• Mr. Roosevelt, ascribing an unde-
fined residuum of power to the President is an unsafe 
doctrine, and that it might lead under emergencies to re-
sults of an arbitrary character, doing irremediable injus-
tice to private right. The mainspring of such a view is 
that the executive is charged with responsibility for the 
welfare of a11 the'people in a general way, and thqt he is 
to play the part of a Universal Providence and set all 
thi.ngs right and that anything that in his judgment will help 
the people he ought to do, unless he is expressly forbidden 
to do it. The wide field of action1;hat this would give to the Executive one can hardly limit. 
What is posited as theory is not always carried out in practice. 
During his presidential term, Taft withdrew without statutory authority 
large tracts of oil lands in California and Wyoming from private ap-
propriation. He did ask Congress to ratify his withdrawal of these lands, 
but Congress failed to comply with the request. In 1915, while Taft 
was busy building a stro.ng case for an "express powers" theory at the 
University of Virginia, the Supreme Court sustained the President's 
order in United States·v~·Midwest Oil ·co. on the grounds that 11weight 11 
be given to the 11 1ong-continued action of the Executive Department--on 
the assumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed to be 
so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice. 11 In other 
words, since Congress didn't challenge the President's action, the Presi-
14wi11iam Howard T~ft; ·our'Chi.ef Ma~istrate and His Powers _{_New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1916), pp. 13 -140. 




dent could, "in conformity with the tacit consent of Congress, withdraw 
in the public interest, any public land from entry or location by pri-
vate parties." 
In what seems to be a sharp contrast to the broad license the doc-
trine of inherent executive powers received in the.Neagle, Debs, and 
Midwest cases, there stands the Supreme Court's decision in.Youngs-
town Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952). The facts in the Steel 
Seizure Case were as follows. The United States had been at 11 war 11 
in Korea for nearly eighteen months, when the negotiation of a collect-
ive bargaining contract between the steel industry and their employees 
reached an impasse. On December 18, 1951, the United Steel Workers of 
America .. gave notic~ that it would strike on December 31. On December 
22, President Truman, acting under the Defense Production Act of 1950 
(as amended), referred the dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board. 
The Wage Stabilization Board failed to bring a settlement, and the 
steel workers• union called for a strike on April 9, 1952. In a radio 
message on April 8, the President announced the issuance of Executive 
Order 10340 which directed Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer to 
seize the steel industry and maintain production. Truman went on to 
say that he did not invoke the "period of waiting" provisions of the 
Taft-Hartley Act, because the strike would have been averted if the 
steel industry had accepted the recomfflendations of the Wage Stabili-
zation Board. The order, then, cited no specific statutory authori-
zation, but rested on Truman's contention that a nation-wide strike of 
steel workers would imperil the national defense, and the President's 
invocation of the general powers vested in him "by the Constitution 
and laws of the United States, and as President of the United States. 
-13-
and Corrnnander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States. 11 16 On 
April 9, Truman sent a message to Congress reporti_ng his action, and, in 
effect, asked Congress to approve or supersede his order. 17 On April 
21., the President again sent a message to Congress, saying that "Congress 
can, if it wishes, reject the course of action that I have followed in 
this matter. 11 18 Congress failed to take any official action. 
Meanwhile, the steel industry was honoring the President's order-.~ 
but under protest as several of the companies had brought suit _against 
Secr~tary Sawyer in the District of Columbia district court, prayi.ng 
for declaratory judgment,.a·nd injunctive relief. On Apr:i.J 30, District 
Court Judge David Pine ruled that Executive Order 10340 was unconsti-
tuti-0nal. Later in the day, the District Court of Appeals, in a five-
four decision, voted to stay the injunction ordered by the district 
court, pending a review by the Supreme-·:court. That Court_ granted certi-
orari on May 3 and handed down a six-three decision on June 2, whi~h 
affirmed the lower court's ruling. -
The complexity of the Steel Seizure Case -iS shown by the fact that 
nine justices filed seven opinions which filled 131 pages in the United 
19 
States Reports. Justice Black delivered the "opinion of the Court" 
with Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton and Clark concurring 
in separate opinions. Chief Justice Vinson, with whom Justices Reed and 
Minton joined, delive~ed the dissenting opinion. 
16cited in Alan F. Westin, The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case 
(New York: Macmillan, 1958), p. 
17aa Cong. Rec. No. 60, 3962-63 (April 9, 1952); cited in Roche, 
"Executive Power and Domestic Emergency," p. 612. 
1898 Cong. R;c. No. 66, 4192 (April 21, 1952); cited by Roche, p. 612.-
19343 U.S. 579-710 (1952). 
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In an article written·for the.Western Po1itical'Qllarterly, Glenden 
A. Schubert notes that the Courtis decision in the·vounSstewn cas~ is 
"somethfng considerably less than the sum of the parts. ••20 The reason 
for the fragmentation of the·majority opifiton is primarily the result 
of Justice Black's ·rigid interpretatton of the separation of powers 
doctrine. He sets up an exercise in deductive logic by first es-
tablishfog the premise that "the President's power, if any, to issue the 
order must stem either from an act:.of Co.ogress or frOm the Constitution 
itself •11 Working on the first half of this pro·position, Black deduces 
that the President's power didn't stem from an act of Congress because: 
there was no express statutory authority for the President·' s order; there 
were no statutes on the books from which such power could ~fairly be 
implied;" the President could have applied the Selective Service' Act of 
1948, the Defense Production Act of 1950, or the "cao1i.ng-off" provisions 
of the Taft-Hartley Act; and finally, Congress had rejected an amendment 
for seizure authority when it was considering the Taft-Hartley Act in 
1947. Therefore, an express delegation of power must be found in the 
Constitution which would authorize the President's seizure order. B·lack 
reasoned that the President had no claim to status as Commander-irr-Cnief, 
because the job of takiny possession of private! property fo order to 
keep labor disputes from stopping production is "for the ·Nati"on's law-
makers, not for its military authorities." Nor could the President 
invoke the "faithful execution of laws" clause, because his lawmaking 
20Glendon A. Schubert, ·"The Steel Case~-. P.r"es:idential .Responsibility 
and Judicial Irresponsibility, 11 ·western.-Politieal: ·uarterl , VI (1953)', 
pp~ 63-4. 'An argument along sirn1 ar nes 1s put ort y award s. 
Corwin, "The Steel Sei.zure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 11 in 
Robert" G. McCfosRey (ed.), E-ssays in Constitutiona:t·"Law; pp. 257~74 •. 
I 










functions are limited by the Constitution "to the recorrmendi.ng of laws 
he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he thinks bad." Since only 
Congress can make statutes, the seizure order cannot stand because it 
is like a law--it proclaims policy as rules and regulations to be 
followed. In deviating from his deductive framework, Black concludes his 
opinion by saying: 
The Founders of the Natton entrusted the lawmaking .. power ta Congress 
alone in both bad and good times. It would do no good to reca.11 
the historical events, the fears of power and hopes for freedom 
that lay behind their choice. Such a review would but confirm our 
holding that his seizure order cannot stand. 
Justice Douglas was basicall~ of the same view as Black, but added 
the consideration that a constitutional seizure under the fifth Amend-
ment would entail the power to make "just compensation .. " Congress., which 
has the power to raise revenues and thus pay compensation, "is the only 
one able to authorize· a seizure or make lawful one that the Pr.esident 
had effected." As Douglas saw it, if the Court sustained the steel 
seizure, "it would be reading Article II as. givi.ng the President not only 
the power to execute the laws, but tp make some." 
Justice Frankfurter had great difficulty accepting the hard-line 
stand taken by 131ack qnd Douglas, and prefa-ced Ms opinion with a warning 
to the other majority justices that "the consideration relev.ant to the 
legal enforcement Qf the principle of seRara~ion pf pewers seem to me 
.more complicated aru:f flexible than may appear from what Mr. Justice 
Bhck has written." He wen~ on to sugges.t that the steel s~eizure issue 
could be met "without attempting to define the President's powers com-
prehensively." The advice given by Frankfurter was apparently taken by 
the other majority. justices, since in the rest of the concurri.ng opinions 
one not only finds a rejection of Black's rigid separation· of powers in-
.",.: 
. ' I . 







terpretation but also the issue of using executive powers in meeting an 
emergency either being avoided or dea1t with in what might best be 
described as 11 open 11 terms. 
For the most part, the thrust of Frankfurter's epinion is an analy-
tical review of various congressional actions which pertained to the 
President's seizure powers. Frankfurter draws the conclusion that 
11 Congress deemed seizu·re so drastic a power· as to require that it be 
carefully circumscribed whenever the President was vested with this 
extraordinary authority. 11 Focusing upon the proceedings which surrounded 
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. he suggests that Congress had 
11 expressed its wi11 11 to withhold the seizure power from the President 
11 as though it has said so in so many words. 11 In the case of Executive 
Order 10340, Frankfurter didn't claim that the ~resident was without 
the. genera1 powers to meet domestic eme.rgencies, but avoided the issue 
by saying that Congress had preempted the seizure power when it had 
been consideri_ng the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
Justice Burton devoted his opinion to an analysis of the Defense 
Production Act and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Burton 
reached the conclusion that the President's order had violated "the 
essence of the principle of the separation of governmental powers, 11 
because Congress had provided a policy, exclusive of seizure, which 
the President could have followed in meeting the emergency. Burton, 
like Frankfurter, avoided defining the scope of inherent. executive 
powers by simply saying, 11 Co.ngress has reserved to itself the right to 
determine where and when to authorize the seizure of property in 
meeti_ng such an emergency. 11 
' 









to deal with the emergency in the Taft-Hartley, Defense Production and 
Selective Service Acts. Under the provisions of the Selective Service 
Act. Clark maintained that the President could have ordered the steel~ 
indu.stry to produce the necessary war material; and if this had failed, 
there would have been statutory authorization for a seizure. Congress, 
then, has the power to deal with emergencies, but in the absence of 
legislation "the President's independent power to act depends upon the 
gravity of the situation confronting the nation." 
Perhaps, the most interesting opinion of the majority justices is 
that of Justice Jackson's. 21 Jackson suggested that the President's 
power could be weighed by considering the "practical aspects of the 
situation in which he acts. 
1. When the President's action is consistent with and under the 
delegation of congressional authority, his constitutional power is the 
strongest. 
In these circumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for what 
it may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. If his act 
is held unconstitutional under these circumstanies, it usually 
means that Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power. 
2. When the President's action is without expressed legislative au-
thority, the legitimacy of his power depends upon practical considerations • 
. he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there 
is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have con-
current authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. 
Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may 
21Jackson's op1n1on is, to put it mildly, a source of deep controversy. 
For example, Corwin writes: "Justice Jackson's rather desultory opinion 
contains little that is of direct pertinence to the constitutional issue 
.•.• ' "The Steel Seizure Case, 11 p. 270. On the other hand, Roche claims 
that Jackson "wrote a superb concurring opinion which, it is to be regretted, 
was not the 'op.:inion of the court; 111 in "Executive Power and Domestic 
Emergency, 11 p. 615. 
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sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not 
invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility. 
In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend 
on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables 
rather than on abstract theories of law. 
3. Finally, Jackson states that when the President 1 s action is 
in conflict 11 with the expressed or implied will of Congress, 11 his power 
is at its 11 lowest ebb. 11 
.•• he can only rely upon his own constitutional powers 
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control 
in such a case by disabling the Congress from acting upon 
the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so 
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, 
for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our 
constitutional system. 
In two short paragraphs, Jackson found that the President's action 
in this case belonged in the third category. The President's action 
could not be placed in the first category, because there was no express 
statutory delegation of seizure power. It did not fall in the second 
category as the President's action was in conflict with the policies 
expressed by Congress in the Selective Service, Defense Production and 
Labor Management Relations Acts. Therefore, the Court could "sustain 
the President only by holding that seizure of such strike-bound indus-
tries is within his domain and beyond control by Congress. 11 
Jackson then procedded to deal with what he considered to be the 
real dilemma of the Steel Seizure Case: 
The appeal, however, that we declare the existence of inher-
ent powers 1 ex necessitate• to meet an emergency asks us to do 
what many think would be wise, although it is something the 
forefathers omitted. They knew what emergencies were, knew the 
pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew, too, 
how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also 
suspect that they suspected that emergency powers would tend to 
kindle emergencies .••. 




an emergency? For Jackson, the constitutionality of the President's 
steel seizure was found by striking a balance among three related var-
iables. First, did the steel workers' strike necessitate the Presi-
dent's seizure of the steel mills without specific statutory authori-
zation? Second, did existing legislation provide the President with 
viable alternatives in which to combat the eme.rgency? And finally, 
if the Court did sustain the steel seizure, would not its decision 
upset the wor~ings of a government of "balanced" powers by affordfog 
the President a ready pretext for usurpation? Jackson was not refutfog 
the claim of inherent executive powers but was s.u.ggesting that the 
gravity of the situation did not warrant the President~s action. 22 In 
view of these considerations, Jackson closes his opinion by saying: 
11 I cannot be brought to believe that this country will suffer if the 
Court refuses further to aggrandize the presidential office, already 
so portent and so relatively immune from judicial review, at the expense 
of Congress." 
Chief Justice Vinson launched the dissenting opinion reproaching 
the majority: "Those who suggest that this is a case involving extra-
ordinary powers should be mindful that these are extraordinary 'times. 11 
It was Vinson's view that although Congress had not declared war, it 
had provided military procurement and anti-inflation legislative pro-
grams in support of the Korean effort and aRy stoppage in steel produc-
22with the benefit of hindsight, Schubert sees the gravity of the 
situation in a different light: · 11 The strike began immediately after the 
announcement of the Supreme Court's decision, and lasted almost two months. 
The Korean war also continued unabated; the elimination of steel produc-
.tion ahd obviously resulted in both a ser~ous cut in defense and munitions 
production and widespread bottlenecks whose effect, in terms of the domes-
tic economy, wou-1d be highly inflationary; the.grave possibility.of·a full-




















tion would seriously imperil these defense programs. He maintained 
that the purpose of the President's seizure was "to faithfully execute 
the laws by acting in an emergency to maintain the status quo, thereby 
preventing collapse of the legislative programs until Congress could 
act. 11 The President was not attempting to defy Congress, because he 
sent a message to Congress, immediately following the seizure order, 
explaining his action and expressing a "desire to cooperate with any 
legislative proposals, approvals, regulating or rejecting the seizure 
of the steel mills. 11 
Vinson believed that the President exhausted the legislative reme-
dies available to him for averting a strike, when he had referred the 
dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board under the authority of the Defense 
Production Act and settlement had failed. The argument, that an emer-
gency did not exist until the Taft-Hartley procedures had been exhausted, 
was invlaid, since the settlement procedures of the Taft-Hartley and 
Selective Service Acts were 11 route(s) parallel to, not connected with, 
the WSB procedure." After mediation by the Wage Stabilization Board 
had failed to bring settlement, the President was "faced with immediate 
national peril through stoppage in steel production on the one hand, and 
faced with the destruction of the wage and price legislative programs on 
the other. II 
In an argument similar to the ones found in the Neagle, Debs and 
Midwest cases, Vinson posited that the Article II grant of executive 
power gives the President the proper authority for seizing the steel 
mills. Although the President was without statutory authorization, 
his action "was consistent with his duty to take care that the laws be 
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presidential acts, Vinson ·concluded his opinion with the fo.ilowing ·com-
ment on the hi story of ·Uexecutive 1 ea:dershtp:" II • the fact that 
Congress and the courts ·nave consiStently reco·gn'fzed and· given· thei_r 
support to such executive act'fon indicates that such a power of seizure 
has been accepteq throughout our history. 11 
Indeed, the Court 1s decision .'in the.Steel Seizure Case imposed no 
serious limitations on the Presidentts "emergency" powers. Justices 
Black and Douglas were the only members of the Court to deny the consti-
tutionality of the President~s power to meet an emergency by exercise 
of .inherent powers. Justtc·es Frankfurter and Burton, reserved judgment 
on the nature and scope of inherent executive powers. Justices Clark 
and Jackson gave their approval to the exercise of implied powers as 
long as there was an absence of express congressional policy. The·three 
dissenting justices, as previously noted, fully accepted the doctrine 
of inherent executive powers and its application to the case. Therefore, 
a majority of at least five justices accepted the constitutionality of 
inherent executive powers. If this is so, why didn't the President's 
seizure of the steel mills stand? 
In Youngstown the fundamental.issue of express versus inherent 
executive powers was buried beneath the circumstances of the case. 
Schubert makes the point we11 when he says that there was an "assumption 
of a majority of the Court that the circumstances under which this case 
arose were those of normalcy ... 1123 The majority 1s as.Sumption of 
"normalcy" was a major factor why the· question of inherent executive 
powers was avoided and the case decided on a less controversial issue. 
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The Court 1 s decision in Youn9S>town was that tfte seizure·pewe.r, a power 
' 
the President might have otherwise, had .• was preempted in this particular 
case when Congress had considered aod rejected an amendment for seizure 
authority in passing the Taft ... Hartley·Act.24 · As Edward Corwin puts it, 
the case was a ujudic'ia l brick. wtJ:hou~ straw ••. That the president does 
possess 'residualt or 1 resuitant 1 powers over and above, or in conse ... 
quence of,.his specifically granted powers to take tem,porary al1eviative 
action in the presence of serious: emergency is a proposition to which 
all but Justices Black and Douglas would probably have assented in the 
absence of the complicatin.9 tsSJJe that was. created by the presic;lent' s re-
fusal to follow the.procedures laid down in the. Taft-HartJey Act. 1125 
Nearly twenty years after Youngstown, theissue of .express versus 
inherent executive powers again returned to the Supreme C.ourt in New York 
Times Co. v. United States.26 This·tiJTle the question was cloaked in a 
First Amendment issue, and it was the President who was.seeking an in-
junction against a company, not 11 vice ·versa 11• as in Youngstown. Briefly, 
the facts of the case were as follows. On June 13, ~he New York Times 
published the first installment of what has become known as the Pgntagon 
Papers-.. a previously top secret, forty-seven volume history of the United 
States~ role in Indoc-hina over a period of three decades. One June 15, 
the Justice Department requested an injunction t.o halt further publication, 
contending that it would cause 11 irreparable injury 11 to the national defense. 
24Pritcbett~ The American Constitution, p. 341; and Schubert, 11 'fhe 
Steel Case,·~ pp. 72 ... 4. 
25corwin, 11 The Steel Seizure Case: A Ju.dicial e-rick Without Straw, 11 
p. 273. 







The same day Dist.r:ict. Cou-rt Judge Gurfein in New YorR tssued Q. '_preliminary 
restraining order against t.he Ttmes pending a hearing. - On Jt,m~ 19_, Judge 
Gurfein denied the reques,t to enjoin the Times., but the Federal appellate 
c.ourt in New York imme<;liatel1 reass~rted the stay pending a hearing. 
In the interim period?, the Washington ~ost began printing more 
leaked sections of t,he Pentason. Pagers on J.une 18. · The Justice Depart-
ment promptly so.ught an injunction against the Post, which Judge Gesell 
of the District Court for th.e. District of Columbia declin_ed to grant. 
The following day the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
ordered the Post to halt publication ~f ·the papers and remanded the case 
to Judge Gesell for a hearing Qn the government's reque_st for an in• 
junction. On June 21, Gesell again denied a prelimi_nary inju_nction and 
again the Justice Department appealed his decision. On June 23, the 
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court 1 s decision but extende.d the 
restraining order to permit the government to appeal to the Supreme Court. 
The same day the Court of .Appeals in New York allowed the .Times to resume 
public;ation of the papers, but remanded the case to. Judge Gurfein for 
proceed'{ngs to. determine those items in the papers t_hat would be dangerous 
to the national security. 
On June 25, the Supreme Court granted certiora_ri bqth to the Times 
an~ to the government in the Washington Post case. On J~ne 30, the Court 
handed down a six-three decision which dissolved the injunctions and the 
newspapers were free to resume publication. As brief as the Court's three 
paragraph 11 per curiam 11 opinion was, it can be condensed to the following: 
11 tAny system of prior restraints of expression .. " (bears}. a heavy 
presumption against its constitutional validity, 11127 and in this case the 
27The-Court here cites Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 





government d_idn tt meet tliE:! IHf:iurden of show\ng justtfi'catton for the 
tmposltton of s:uch a :restra,.tnt. ~· 11.28 In a maze of cross-concurrences, 
Justices Blac-k, Doug] as_, .Br.en-nan, Ste.wart, White and Marsha 1l each 
wrote, a concur.t;ing opinoi.n., .wntl e thief Justice Bur.9-er amt Justices 
.Harlan p.nd Blackman each wrote ,a dissenting opinion, principa.lly 
protesting the amount. of time the Justices had to think about the 
case. 
The meat of Justice B:lack's opindcim is a response to ·the oral 
a_rgument made· by S0 lic 'f.tor General Griswo 1 d. Gri swo 1 d .fiad asserted 
that 11.to~re are other parts of tfle Constitution that grant power· and 
respoFlsibilittes to. the Executive ..• the First.Amendment was not 
intended to m.ake it impossible for the Executive to functii:>n or. to pro-
tect the security of the Untted States. 1129 Suprisingly, Black did not 
cite from the Youngstown case, but responded to Griswold's assertion by 
saying that; 
The Government do~s.not eveR attempt to rely on any act of Congr.ess. 
Instead, it makes the bold and dangerously far-reaching contention 
tha~ th~ c;ourts should take .it upon themselves t<l 'make 1 ·a law 
abridging freedom of the press in the name of equity, presidentia 1 
power-and national. s~curity, even when the representatives of the 
people in Congress have adhered to the command of the First Amend-
ment and refused to make such a law .... Ta.find that the Presi-
dent has 'inherent power' to halt the publication of new by resort 
. to the courts would wipe out the First Amendment and destroy the 
fundamental 1 i berty and security of the very people th~ G.overnment 
hopes to make 'secur~.· 
Black's position is' quite clear: the First .Amendment is abs'ol:ute; neither 
Congress nor the President has ~he power~ i~herent or e~press~ to ~bridge 
28Here,' ttle Court cited Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 
402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). 
29Gri.swold 1 s .quote is found. in ~he text of;Bla,ck's oprn.1on;, f.or 
Griswqld's full ~statement, s.ee The.Pentagon Papers (New Yo.r.k.: Quadrangle 










the freedom of the press,30 
Justice Douglas concurred with Black and opened his opinion with 
the claim that the First Amendment "leaves, in my view, no room for 
governmental restraint on the press, 11 and in any event, there were 11 no 
~ ''}"• 
statute(s}u which barred the publication of the material the newspapers 
sought to use. Douglas proceeds to the proposition that 11any power that 
the Government possesses must come from its 'inherent power. 111 quoting. 
from Hi'rabayashi v. United States, he said that 11 (t)he power to wage 
war is 'the power td wage war successfully, tn31 and added that 11 the 
war power stems from a declaration of war·. The Constitution by Article 
l, sec. 8, gives Congress, not the PY'esident, power -!,to declare war.• 
Nowhere are presidential wars authorized. We need not decide therefore 
what leveling effect the war power of Congress might'have. 11 
Gtven the cros:s..-concurrences· of Black. and Douglas and tlie persuasive 
language of their 'Opinions in both thts case and that of Yourigstowrt, it 
seems fair to say that they subscribe to two separate principles: (1) the 
First Amendment absolutely forbtds injunctions .against the publ icat1on 
of news; and (2) in any event, the President has no inherent power 
to seek or obtain an injunction.32 Like Youngstown, the other majority 
30rn a footnote, Black cites Madison: "If they (the first ten 
amendments) are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tri-
bunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the 
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against 
every assumption of pow~r in the Legislative or Executive; they will 
naturally be led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly 
stipulated for in the Constitution by the decl.aration of rights; 11 
l Annals of Congress 439 (1834). 
31320 U.S. 81, 93. 
32Peter D. Junger, "Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon 







justices had a difficult time acceptt.ng the hard .. ltne stand taC<en by 
Black and Douglas. It is su.ggested that in New York Times the Court 1 s 
decision turns on the cross.concurring -Opinions of Justices Stewart 
and White. One one hand, White clearly disavows any absolute effect to 
the First Amendment. On the other, Stewart posits that th.e President 
has the r_ights, and the constitutional duty":'- 11as a matter of sovereign 
perogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know law--through the 
promulgamation and enforcement of executive regulations, to protect the 
confidentiality necessary to carry out (his) resp.onsibil ities in the 
fields of international relations and national defense. 11 
In an opinion with wh.ich. Stewart j~ined, Justice White began with a 
sunmary of his .conclu.sions: 
I do not say that in no circumstances would the First Amendment 
permtt an injunctton _against publ ishi.ng information about. govern ... 
ment plans- or operattons, • , • I am ccmftde.n:t tfi.at ... , di:s.clo· 
sut!e(of these documents wtll do substantial damage to puolic 
interests. N)evertfieless •• ,. the United States has not satisfied 
the very heavy burden wh'ich it. must meet·~to warrant an injunction 
.against publication in these cases, .at least in the absenc.e of 
ex ress·and·a ro rtatel limited Con ressional authorization for 
· prtor·re~~raints tn·ctrcumstahces Sijch as these. emphasis added 
Go\ng further, he states: 
At least in the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its 
own investigations and findings, I am quite ·unable to agree that 
the inherent powers of the Executive and thec.our-ts reach so far 
as to authorize remedies having such sweeping potential for in· 
hibiting publication of the press. · 
Although it appears that the main support for Justice White's 
opinion is the lack of inherent authority in the E~ecutive, 33 he goes 
on to discuss the First Amendment and the standards which should be 
applied in granting injunctions against the press. While the discµssion 
33For example, it is Peter Junger's view that White's opinion is 
ubased clearly- and solely on the laGk of inherent power in the Executive; 11 








is dedkated to an analysts- of the legislattve history of the Espionage 
Act of 1917 and a summary of .c'dminal provisions which might apply to the 
publication of the papers, it also suggests the existence of some inherent 
executive authority since White views the First Amendment as a constitu-
tional prohibition on the extent of that authority. Moreover, because 
White concurred in Justice Stewart's opinion, his vote can best be under-
stood oy undertaki~g an analysis of that opinion. 
Justice Stewart's opinion is concerned primarily with the inherent 
power of the Presidency. A review of the opinion leaves little doubt 
that the President does have inherent power. Stewart began his opinion 
by noting that ttin the governmental structure created by our Constitution_, 
the Executive is endowed with enormous power in the. two reaated areas of 
national defense and international relations. This power, largely un-
cnecked by the Legtslattve and Judicial branches has ~een pre~sed to tne 
very !lilt since the advent of the missile age. 11 He proceeded to pOint 
out that in the absence of those"gover.nmental checks.and balances 11 which 
are normally present, the 11onlJ effective restraint u.pon executive pol icy 
and power in the areas of national defense and international affairs may 
lie 1n an enlightened citizenry ..•• 11 For Stewart, then~ there is a 
problem between t.he near absolute power of the President with respect to 
national defense and foreign affairs and a greater nee.d in these areas for 
the freec;lom of the press that is:~assured by the First Amendment. But such 
a 11 problem 11 is not for the courts to resolve, at least not in the Post and 
Times cases. 
[I]n the cases_before us we are asked neither to construe specific 
regulations nor to apply specific laws. We are· asked, instead, to 
perform a function that the Constitution gave to the Executive, not 
the Judiciar,y. We are asked, quite simply, to prevent the publ i-
cation o'f material that the Executive Branch insists should not, 
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Executtve ts correct witn respect to some of the documents in-
volved. But I cannot say tnat disclosure of any of them will 
surely result in direct, immediate and irreparable damage to 
our Nation or its people. That being so, there can under the 
First Amendment be but one judicial resolution of the issues 
before us. I join the judgments of the Count. 
Thus, the test of 11direct, immediate, and irreparable damage 11 might 
overcome the obstacle of the First Amendment, but in this case one 
cannot see how it could authorize the courts without a law to enforce. 
And, since Justice White concurred in it, one can only conclude that 
he too would allow restraints in those cases where there was merit to 
the Executive~s claim of damage to the national interest. 
Justice Marshall concurred. His only reference to the First 
Amendment was to deny that it raises 11 the ultimate issue in these cases. 11 
Addressing himself to the separation of powers issue, he leaves no doubt 
as to the power of the Prestdent to _restrain the disclosure of informa .. 
tton tn the interest of nattonal security. 
The problem here is whether in this particular case the Executive 
Branch has authority to invoke the equity jurisdiction of the courts 
to protect what it believes to be the national interest •.•• 
[I]n some situations it may.be·that under whatever inherent powers 
the Government may have, as well as the implicit authority derived 
from the Presidentts mandate to conduct foreign affairs and to 
act as Commander-in-Chief there is a basis for the invocation of 
the equity jurisidction of this Court as a.n aid to prevent the 
publication of material damaging to "national security, 11 however 
that term may· be defined. 
It would, however, be utterly inconsistent with the concept of 
separation of power for this Court to use its power of contempt 
to prevent behavior that Congress has specifically declined to 
prohibit. There would be a similar clamage to the basic concept 
of these·co-equal branches of Government if when the Executive 
Branch Bas adequate authority gr4nted by Congress to protect 
"national security" it can choose instead to invoke the contempt 
power of a court to enjoin the threatened conduct. The Consti-
tution provides that Congress shall make laws, the President shall 
execute laws, and courts interpret laws. (citing Youngstown) It 
did not provide for government by injunction in which the courts 
and the Executive Branch can 11make law" without regard to the action 
of Congress. 






majortt.ropinton, Brenn~n~s optnton is concerned only with the First 
Amendment. He stated that there are precedents 1ndicatlng that in 
time of war, in an extremely narrow class of cases, prior restraints 
may be placed upon the press. He argued, however, that if there is 
such an exception to the absolutes of the First Amendment neither the 
proof or all_egations made 1n New York Times place the case within the 
exception. ttfor if the Executive Branch seeks judicial aid in prevent~ 
tng publication, it must inevitably submit the basis upon which that 
aid is sought to scrutiny by the judiciary. 11 Thus, this sta.tement can 
be read as saying that if the executive branch had shown facts falling 
within the exception, then it might have been entitled tq the injunc-
tion. 
It is not necessary to consider the dissenting opinions of Chief 
Just ice Burger and Just ice Bl acl<mun; as has been pointed out, tne.y-
mere.ly suggest that the Justices: needed more time to think about the 
case. However, since Justice Harlan 1s opinion, in which the Chief 
Justice and Justice Blackmun concurred, does address itself to the 
merits of the case, it is appropriate to touch on that opinion here. 
Simply put, i.t was Harlan 1 s opinion ·that the Executive had the power, 
with.out specific congressional sanction, to seek ang obtain the injunc-
tion against the publication of the Pentagon Papers. 
As Harlan saw it, the power to obtain the injunction was in the 
Executive 1 s power to conduct the nation's foreign affairs. The Executive, 
then, had the right to the injunction since ... the subject matter of the 
dispute was within the proper compass of the President's. foreign relations 
power. 11 For precedents supporting this position, Harlan cited (1) the 








courts 1nformat1on relattng to forefgn affairs or the national de-
. . . 
fense; 34 (2} relations with foreign powers which have no direct effect 
upon domestic interests;35 and (3} matters· which, to the extent they 
affect domestic interests, do so with the authorization of Congress. 36 
In New York Times, there were two constitutional questions that 
could have been answered. The first question was whether the Govern-
ment as a whole could restrain the publication of ~he Pentagon_ Papers 
despite the First Amendment. Assuming that the Government could re• 
strain publication, the next query was whether the Executive has the 
power to fmpose such restratnts without congressional authorization. 
Since the Court did refuse to permit the restraint, it would seem that 
the basis for its decision has to be a negative answer to one or both 
of the questions posed. But when adding and subtracting the opinions 
of the various Justi'ces, the synthests which appears su.ggests that 
neither of the constitutional considerations standing by itself was 
determinative of the case. 
What one does find in the synthesis is a weighing of the damage 
which might be suffered by the unational interest" against both the 
First Amendment and the separation of powers question. And it follows 
without close reading of the Times case that the damage did not warrant 
34united States v. Re.Ynolds, 345 U.S. l (1953). 
3510 Annals of Congress 613 (1800}; a statement by John Marshall 
on the floor of the House of Representatives. 
36United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp .• , 299 U~S. 304 (1936); 
conviction of offense created by Joint Resolution of Congress was proper 
despite arguments that the Joint Resolution was an unconstitutional de-le-
gation of authority by Congress to the President. 
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the granting of ~n tnjunctton ,against the puoltcat1on of the papers. 
Perhaps, thts was Just tee White t-s. position when he stated that 11 the 
United States had not satisfted the very heavy burden which it must 
meet to warrant an injunctfon against publication in these cases, at 
least in absence of express and appropriately limited Gongressional 
authorization for prior restraints in circumstances such as these. 11 
The Courtts balancing of considerations in New York Times--and in 
Youngstown~~has led Peter Junger to posit that there is only one prin-
ciple that can be derived from the two cases: 11 The doctrine of the 
separation of powers denies the Executive the constitutional power to 
take acti6n on his own authorization if that action would be of do4btful 
constitutionality had it been authorize<;! by Congress. 1137 
Jungerts po'int, I beJieve, is well t;aken if one considers the 
si.rntlartttes between the two cases. First, like Youngstown, there was 
I 
a major"tt.r assumption that the ctrcumstances of the Times case arose 
under· a situation of 11 norma lcy. 11 Neither the Korean 11 war 11 nor the 
Vtetnam "war 11 wer~ declared by Congress and in both cases the Executive 
argued that the war made his actions necessary. In Youngstown, the 
steel plants.were seized to prevent a strike that supposedly would have 
catastrophic effects on the war effort. In New York Times, the execu-
tive branch justified the censorship upon the grounds that the publica-
tion of the papers would have adverse effects on the ~onduct of the war, 
as well as our relations with other countries. 
The second similarity is th~t in both cases the Court dealt with 
the problem of inherent executive powers on and~ad hoc basis. In Youngs-
37 Junger", "Down Memory Lane: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 11 p. 38. 
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town ~he question was whether the Executive had the inherent power to 
setze the nation•s steel mills. And, as pointed out above, one of the 
questions in New York Times was whether the Executive had the inherent 
power to censor the press. 
A third and final similarity38 between the two cases rests in 
Justice Holmest .famous·admonition; "Great cases like hard cases make bad 
1 aw. • . • tt 39 Whereas Just1ces Harl an and Bl ackmun accused New York Times 
of being a great case, and therefore a maker of bad law, one commentator 
described Youngstown as 11 the legal battle of the century. u40 In terms of 
11greatness, 11 both cases received massive attention in th.e press and 
' 
appeared at the time to involve questions of major national importance. 
In New York Times, the press was understandbly enough almost unanimously 
opposed to the Executivets attempts to censor some of tts members. Reminis-
ctng about Xo~n9stown tn nts Memoirs, President Truman recalled that there were 
few instances in history where the press was more sensational 
or partisan •• , • What was more disturbing was what amounted 
to editorial intervention by the press of America in a case 
pending before the Supreme Court of the United States. News 
stor1:es and editorials. • • inflaming public opin"ton were pre-
38This is not to say other· similarities do not exist. For example, 
the progression of Youngstown an.d New York Times were both remarkably··· 
swift, and in both cases, the decision of the Court was riddled witn 
numerous opinions. 
3911 ••• great cases are called great, not by reason of their real 
importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident 
of immedia.~e overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and dis-
torts the jud.gment. These immediate interests exercise a k.ind of hydrau-
1 ic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and 
before which even well settled principles of law will ben; 11 dissent in in 
Northern Securities Co. v. United States 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 1904 • 
40J. Banks, 11 SteeT, Sawyer and the .Executive Power, 11 14 U. Pitt L. 
Rev. (1953); cited by Junger, p. 29. Junger points out that Banks was 
counsel for Jones and Lauglin Steel Corporation in the Youngstown case. 
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judgfng and dectdtng tne case at the ~lry tfme the Court itself 
was nearing arguments- for Both sides. 
Despite the similarities between th~ two cases, one cannot read 
I 
the opinions in New York Times without concluding that the First Amend-
ment problem played a major role tn th.e process by which the majority .. 
reached its decision that publication of the Pentagon Papers could not 
be enjoined. The argument maqe hy Justices White, Stewart and Marshall 
concerning Congress~ evident past refusal to authorize injunctive re-
medies42 is one of two grounds forthe Court denying relief in Times. 
The at.her ground is Justice Stewart's argument t.hat the Government 
did not prove that the publication of the papers would "surely result 
in direct, immediate and irreparable injury to (the} Nattun or its 
people. 0 43 While tne emphasts of thts principle is: on- tf:te. "bnportance 
of free expression, ttoobviously does not hold the First Amendment ab-
solute, and thus recognizes that substantia 1 counterva tl ing state in-
terests may outweigh the values of expression. For this reason, the 
balancing principle, which a majority of the Court apparently accepted,44 
would in some situations sanction actions resulting from executive de~ 
41ttarry s. Truman, Memoirs: 
475; cited by Junger, p. 30 
Years of Trial of Hope µ_ (l 95,6}, p. · 
' . 
42 rn 1917, Congress rejected an amendment to the Esptonage Act 
which would have given the President the power to prohtott, on patn of 
fine or 'imprisonment, the publication of any material relating to the 
national defense. 
43see suprq, pp. 27-28. 
44Justice Douglas, Brennan and White would presumably concur in the 
application of the standard proposed in Justice Stewart 1 s opinion for 
purposes of denyi~g an injunction, 
.j 
.. 34 .. 
terminations of threats to the nattonal security. 45 
In sum, then, the CourttS- s-tresS" tn Ttrnes on the First Amendment 
problem suggests that some constitutional questions are more to be 
avotded than others. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in Youngstown, 
"It ought to be, but apparently is not, a matter of common understand-
ing that clashes between different branches of the government should be 
avoided if a legal ground of less explosive potentialities is available." 
The Court could have decided that the Executive lacked the inherent 
power to obtain the injunction against publication, but instead Times 
turned on the question of whether a law passed by Congress authorizing 
such an injunction would be constitutional. Thus, in the end, the 
Pentagon Papers case imposes no serious limitations on the Executive 
in terms of asserted powers. 46 The case, as William Van Alstyne puts 
tt, was a l\const1tuti6nal anti: .. cl imax 0 in the respect th.at uin no sense 
can it be said to have beltttled the executive power as that power was 
understood the day before the decision came down. 1147 
Given the events called Watergate, the Supreme Court's decision in 
45In an early analysis of the Pentagon Papers case, the Harvard 
L,aw Review viewed the ba lanc'fng approach as an important development 
in constitutional law, supporttng.its assessment with. the hypothettcal 
situation where the publication of detailed plans of future military 
operations or of sophisticated scient.ific data of military importance 
would be of greater value to hostile foreign nations tharl.:to an informed 
critique of .public policy; "Freedom of Speech, Press and Association," 
Harvard Law Review, 85 (1971), p. 205. . · 
46As Ju.nger notes, "An opponent of unrestrained executive power 
would presumably have been happier if the first amendment had never 
been mentioned in New York Times, 11 in "Down Memory Lane: The Case of 
tne Pentagon Papers, 11 p. 52. 
47wil liam Van Alstyne, "A Political and Constitutional Review of 







United States v .. Ntxon48 had its: roots in New York Times. Pfri'l'tp B. 
Kurland, who stresses- ttlis potnt at the beginning ·Of an art1c]e wrHten 
for the UCLA Law·Reviewts symposium on the Nixon case, states that it 
was the publication of tfle Pentagon Papers which 11exacerbated the 'para-
noia of tfle Nixon adtninistratton, that called forth the plumbers and 
other extraconstitutional devices by a chagrined executive ••• Hence 
the Ellsoerg trial, the concealment of break-ins and wiretaps, and White 
House behavior that looked suspiciously like an attempt to bribe a trial 
judge with a different federal appointment. 1149 Having contributed tan-
. gentia l ly to the events of Watergate by its decisions in New York Times 
and tne Democratic C9nvention case~, 5° Kurland maintains that the Court 
proceeded "to oust a President" in United States v. Nixon: 
The Nixon case was rushed to decision skipping adjudication, 
so that its effect would be plainly felt in the impeachment pro-
ce.sse~ tnat were.·under way. Even before tne event, it was easy 
to predtc~ tnat the Court's decision would be determinative of 
the viability of .the Nixon presidency. The decision was reached 
on July 24, 1974; the Htluse Judiciary Co1T111ittee voted impeachment 
articles on the 31st of July and the 1st of August; the President 
all but confessed his implication in the Watergate coverup when 
he published the tapes ordered produced by the Cou5f' on August 
5, 1974: the President resigned on August 9, 1974. 
In United States v. Nixon, the Supreme Court for the first time 
passed on the question of executive privilege for confidential com~~­
munications to which the President is a party. While Kurland maintains 
4894 S. Ct. 3090 (1974). 
49Philip B. Kurland, "United States v. Nixon: Who Killed Cock 
Robin? 11 S.vnposium: United States v. Nixon (October, 1974; rpt. UCLA 
Law Review XXII), pp .. 68-9. --
50otBrien v. Brown, 409 U.S. l (1972); ·Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 11. s. 
1201 (1972) • 





on one hand that the Court was instrumental in ousting a President, 
he concludes on the other that the Court's reasoning in United States 
v. Nixon was good for that case only; the Nixon decision "purports to 
justify a conclusion that the Court obviously thought necessary in the 
circumstances of the grim political situation with which the country 
was faced," but it "hardly explicated the complicated concept of execu-
tive privilege and its proper and improper use. 11 52 Along these lines, 
I think it can be said that United States v. Nixon, like New York Times, 
was a "constitutional anti-climax" for the simple reason that claims 
of inherent power always boil down to arguments based on necessity. In 
this case, the handwriting was on the wall. Thus, it is not surprising 
that the Court rejected President Nixon's assertion of a ~generalized 
privilege of confidentiality" under the circumstances of Watergate, 
where it was not alleged that interests of national security or of 
foreign relations were in any way involved. 
To recall what is recent and well-known history, the District 
Court for the District of Columbia issued a subpoena on the motion of 
the Watergate special prosecutor directing the President to produce 
certain tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations 
with White House assistants, which were in connection with the trial 
of ~even individuals53 indicted for various offenses,. including con-
spiracy to defraud the United States and the obstruction of justice. 
52Kurland, op. cit., p. 74. 
53The seven defendants were John N. Mitchell, H. R. Haldeman, John 
D. Ehrlichman, Charles W. Colson, Robert C. Mardian, Kenneth W. Parkin-
son, and Gordon Strachan. Each had occupied either a position of re-
sponsibility on the White House staff or the Conmittee for the Re-Elec-























In response, the President's counsel filed a motion to quash the 
subpoena, essentially arguing that the Executive had an absolute, 
unreviewable, discretionary privilege to control the release of any 
presidential tapes and documents. The district court denied the Presi-
dent's motion to quash the subpoena, but stayed its order pending 
appellate review. The Supreme Court took the unusual step of granting 
a writ of certiorari before judgment. 
Writing for an unanimous Court,54 Chief Justice Burger affirmed 
the decision of the lower court, holding that the President's claim 
of absolute privilege to withhold tapes, unsupported by any claims 
of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security 
interests, could not prevail in view of the special prosecutor's de-
monstrated, specific need for the tape recordings and documents. 
Before the Court dealt with the substantive issue of executiv~~ 
privilege, it had to establish its jurisdiction by dealing with the 
issues of whether it was an 11 intra-branch 11 dispute. Although the 
Court dealt with each of these issues separately, any question of pos-
sible presidential immunity from judicial process was simply subsumed 
into the substantive issues of the case. Needless to say, all of 
these preliminary matters were resolved in favor nf the Court's juris-
diction, though the reasoning left a great deal to be desired. 55 
54Justice Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision 
of the case. 
55For similar arguments along this line, see Kenneth L. Karst and 
Harold W. Horowitz, "Presidential Prerogative and Judicial Review;" Paul 
J. Mishkin, 11 Great Cases and Soft Law: A Comment on United States v. 






It is believed that an analysis of any particular issue going to 
the jurisdiction of the Court reveals the pattern of the Nixon opinion. 
For this reason, I will only examine one issue of this type, "Justicia-
bil ity.11 The argument made by the President's counsel was that the 
conflict between the Chief Executive and special prosecutor was "an 
intra-branch dispute between a subordinate and superior officer of the 
Executive Branch and hence not subject to judicial resolution. n56 
Carried a step further, the counsel asserted teat since both officers 
were of the Executive Branch, the issue was a "political question, 11 
and not appropriate for the courts to decide. 
In rejecting this conclusion, the Court first asserted that 11a 
claim of an 'intra branch dispute,• without more, has never operated 
to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability does not depend upon 
such a surface inquiry." The question then becomes what does justicia-
bil ity depend upon? What fol lows is oat, as Kurland puts,,it, "a prin-
cipled answer but an ad hoc respons~: "-
In light of the uniqueeess of the setting in which the con-
flict arises, the fact that both parties are officers of the 
Executive Branch cannot be viewed as a barrier to justicia-
bi1 ity. It would be inconsistent with the applicable law and: 
regulation, and the un·ique facts of this case to conclude other 
than that the Special Prosecutor has standing to bring this 
action and that a justiciable controversy is presented for 
decision. 
Obviously, there is no room for doubt about the "uniqueness of 
the setting, but, as Kurland ~nd others58 point out, one can question 
56The counsel's argument is cited by Burger, 94 S. Ct. 3100. 
57Kurland, op, cit., p. 71. 
58For example, see Mishkin, "Great Cases and Soft Law ••• , 11 
pp. 81~2; and Alstyne, ".A Political and Constitutional Review of United 






the relevancy of "the applicable law11 in view of the Court's citations. 59 
The Court did proclaim thtt because the power of the Attorney General 
was derived from Congress, 60 the special prosecutor had vested in him 
the "explicit power to contest the invocation of executive privilege 
in the process of seeking evidence deemed relevant to the performance 
of these specially delegated duties. 11 Since the authority delegated 
to the special proseoator had 11 the force of !law," he had the power, 
pursuant to the regulations set by Congress, to take the action in 
question. 
59For example, the Court, citing United States v. ICC, stated that 
"whatever the correct answer on the merits, these issues are 'of a 
type which are traditionally justiciable.'" 377 U.S., at 430. However, 
as Alstyne points out: "(United States v. ICC) may well have been ap-
propriate for the Supreme Court to cite in United States v. Nixon as a 
first step in determining the Special Prosecutor's 'standing• to have 
applied for a subpoena, but it is without value as to whether his repre-
sentation ~fan exclusively executive interest (i.e., whether judicial 
assistance should be sought to secure evidence for a prosecutive use) 
may be preempted by the President of the United States, once the President 
himself makes a direct assertion in court as Chief Executive that assis-
tance by the court is not only not desired, but that he affirmatively 
opposes it." In the same reference, Alstyne goes on to say that "United 
States v. ICC said nothing whatever of course, as to whether the President 
of the United States might have authoritatively preempted the Attorney 
General in district court by entering an appearance on his own behalf, 
as Chief Executive, to move that the proceeding should be qismissed. 
Had he done so, the Court would then have had occasion to determine 
whether anything other than a purely executive interest was involved, 
a question not deemed necessary to consider at the time at all. The 
President had made no such assertion; 11 op. cit., n. 57, p. 134. 
60The Court stated that 11 under the authority of Ar?t. II, sec~ :.2, 
Congress has vested in the Attorney General the power to conduct the 
criminal li~igation of the United States Government. 28 U.S.C., sec. 
516. It has also vested in him the power to appoint subordinated offi-
cers to assist him in the discharge of his duties. 28 U.S.C., secs. 
509, 5JO, 515, 533. Acting pursuant to these statutes, the Attorney 
General has delegated the authority to represent the United States in 
these particular matters to a Special Prosecutor with unique authority 







What the 'Court seemed to be saying, although not in so many words, 
was that the Attorney General's regulation 61 provided the special pro-
secutor with the special safeguards of independence and tenure, since 
Congress had validly vested in the Attorney General the power to pro-
secute and to appoint &lthers to assist hi.m. Therefore, an 11 intra-
branch dispute" could not be settled within the Executive Branch. be-
cause the President had no authority over the special prosecutor with 
regard to the issue in question. Citing several cases which support 
a private individual 1s right to claim the benefit of federal regulations 
against government imposition, 62 Burger treats them as sufficient to 
establish the Attorney General's regulation as giving the special prose-
cutor adequate protection againstt the President. The opinion suggests, 
then, that the special prosecutor was not within the chain of command 
that leads to the President. Thus, the. prosecutor had the proper au-
thorization to seek assistance from the courts to secure evidence with 
respect to trails arising from the presidential election in 1972. In 
passing, Burger deemed it significant, according to a provision in the 
regulation, that 11 the Special Prosecutor was not to be removed without 
the 'consensus' of eight designated leaders of Congress." But the Court 
did not consider the possible constitutional separation-of-powers issues 
raised by such an arrangement. 
In view of these propositions, it is important to point out that 
nowhere in the Nixon opinion does the Court deal with the significance 
of its previous decisions in such cases as Myers v. United States.63 
6lsee supra, n. 60, p. 39. 
62vitarslli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 
U.S. 363, 388 (1957); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954). 












In the Myers case, the Court stro~gly asserted the inherent power of 
the President to control and remove subordinate policy-level officials 
in the Executive Branch despite congressional legislation seeking to 
limit it. The Court's decision in United States v. Nixon appears to 
implicitly overrule Myers with its holding that Congress may authorize 
the Attorney General to establish limitations on the President's power. 
Putting this problem in its proper perspective, Alstyne notes: "If 
one insists that the power to provide for trnappointment and removal 
of an 'inferior' officer also carries with it the power to provide 
for the constitutional finality of an (article II) executive decision 
that such person may make, the officer is, to that extent, not an 
'inferior' at all--and thus the clause is inoperative. 1164 According 
to Als.jyne, the real issue in United States v. Nixon was, as the 
Court put it, whether or not "a President's decision is final in de-
termining what evidence is to be used in a given criminal case. 1165 
But he concludes that this issue "was buried and lost, subsumed in the 
mere determination of the Special Prosecutor's standing to sue and the 
justiciability ~f his claim. 1166 
Having established that the special prosecutor did have standing 
64Alstyne, op. cit., p. 137. On this point, Alstyne concludes: 
"Only to the extent that the supererogatory authority of the President 
of the United States is left free to assert itself'(in any instance 
when the President resolves the proper use of article II in some man-
ner contrary to the initial determination of another) can it fairly be 
said, that, in respect to that power, the other person is truly an 
'inferior' officer;" p. 137. 
6594 S. Ct. at 3100. 


















and that the issue was justiciable, the Court proceeded to deal with 
the ultimate issue of "executive privilege." The Court's handling of 
the executive privilege question repeats the pattern described above--
an ad hoc response to the facts of the case which rises little above 
11 ipse dixit. 11 In essence, the Court held that the President has a 
privilege, ":fundamental to the operation of government and inextri-
cably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution, 11 to 
p~otect and maintain confidential communications within the Executive 
Branch. However, that privilege in this case could not "prevail over 
the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administra~ 
tion of criminal justice ••• (I)t must yield to the demonstrated, 
specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. 11 
There can be little doubt that the Court's reasoning in United 
States v. Nixon is good for tnis case only. We are told that there 
is executive privilege, but that the privilege is not absolute; it 
will defer at least to the needs of criminal justice. As Professor 
Kurland points out, given the reasoning of the Court, 11 it would be 
necessary to hold that none of the confidential communications pri-
vileges now extant, whether that of husband-wife, lawyer-client, phy-
sician-patient, priest-penitant, would protect against a subpoena for 
production of such materials. 1167 While the opinion emphasizes that 
the process of decision is a balancing process, there are problems in 
its language, particularly if, as Kurland suggests, we substitute 
any of the other confidential communications privileges for that 
which is the subject of the Court's judgment: 





In this case we must weigh the importance of the general pri-
vilege of confidentiality of presidential communications in 
performance of his responsibilities against the inroads of such 
a privilege on the administration of criminal justice. The 
interest in preserving confidentiality is weighty indeed and 
entitled to great respect. However we cannot conclude that 
advisers will be moved to temper the candor of their remarks 
by the infrequent occassions of disclosure because of the pos-
sibility that such conversations will be called for in the con-
text of a criminal prosecution. 
On the other hand, the allowance of the privilege to withbold 
evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would 
cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely 
impair the function of the courts. A President's acknowledged 
need for confidentiality in the communications of his office 
is general in nature, whereas the constitutional need for pro-
duction of relevant evidenc~ in a criminal proceeding is spe-
cific and central to the fair adjudication of justice. Without 
access to specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally 
frustrated. 
If we were to accept these propositions, each of the confidential 
privileges (husband-wife,etc.) would fall when the contents of the 
privil.eged material were so.ught for used in criminal proceedfogs. Read 
in this light, the Court's reasoning in holding against President 
Nixon is sparse and at best rests on the grounds of surface plausi-
bility. In view of the serious implications which the reasoning car-
ries, it seems most unlikely that the narrow holding of United States v. 
Nixon will be applied in the future. Could there ever be another 
Wagergate? 
Besides these problems in the Court's reasoning, there is also 
the problem of the Court assuming that executive privilege 11 is in-
extricably rooted in the separatd-on of powers under the Constitution." 
In the face of strong, if not conclusive, evidence that executive pri-
vilege is a 11myth, 11 Professor Raoul Berger asserts that this assumption 
11 legitimate[s] and anoint[s1 presidential claims that are vitiated 



























abuses. 11 Although the Court did hold that this constitutionally-
based privilege must yield to the need for complete evidence in cri~ 
minal prosecutions, the impact of the Nixon decision on the Executive 
Branch 11 is not inhibiting but life-giving. 11 69 To cite Professor 
Kurland once again, "(The Court's} holding that article II is the 
source of the confidential communication privilege, which the opinion 
validates for the first time, may create momentous problems. 1170 
* * * 
In spite of the understandable alarm so recently expressed about 
the spiraling growth of executive power, 71 the Court's decisions in 
United States v. Nixon, New York Times Co. v. United States, and Youngs-
town Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer cannot be read as imposing any serious 
limitations on the principle of presidential executive supremacy. To 
recall what Justice Jackson in his eloquent Youngstown concurrence said: 
11With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered 
no technique for long pr.eserving free government except that the 
Executive be under the law ••.. 11 But as I have suggested in this 
paper, the limits of the law found in each decision is only relevant 
to the circumstances surrounding the case. Indeed, what seems to emerge 
68Raoul Berger, "The Incarnation of Executive Privilege," in Sym 
posium: United States v. Nixon, p. 11. 
69Karst and Horowitz, op. cit., p. 67. 
70Kurland, op. cit., pp. 74-5. 
71Rexfo~d G. Tugwell and Thomas E. Cronin (eds.}, The Presidency 
Reaplrai~ed (New York: Pra~ger, 1974}; and, Arthur M. Schlesinger, 













from the three cases are generalized constitutionally-based executive 
powers that are weighed against arguments based on "necessity." In 
view of Jackson's statement, the Court also seems to be aware of what 
Justice Brandeis said in his dissent in Myers v. United States: Such 
powers 11might conceivably be deemed indispensable to democratic govern-
ment.11 Thus, the role of the Court has been to walk a ttght line be-
tween these two rationales, while an ever-exapnding Presidency continues 
to grow. But the rise of an imperial Presidency certainly does not 
rest with the Supreme Court. As Paul Mishkin notes in his closing 
comments on the Nixon case, 
The fundamental evil is that the Court was confronted with 
the issue. The basic failing was that the problem was not 
resolved by the political system, including the other two 
branches of government, before it reached the Court. But 
the causes of that failure, and possibl,2cures, must be the 
subject of a different, larger inquiry. 
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